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Empathy is seen as a virtue or even a 
necessary skill in many professions. 
However, while proponents of the 
concept argue that it plays a fundamen-
tal role in our moral judgements, critics 
have objected that our empathy is easily 
manipulated and that our dispositions 
to empathise more strongly with those 
close to or resembling ourselves makes 
it a poor moral guide. We argue that 
while not necessary for professional 
moral judgement, professional moral 
reasoning would be fundamentally 
amiss without the ability and willing-
ness to perceive the situation from the 
perspective of those they are trained to 
serve.
Introduction
Empathy is seen as a virtue or even a 
necessary skill in many professions. In 
the health professions, empathy training 
has long been considered an integral 
part of the qualifying education and the 
ability and willingness to empathise is 
seen as essential for the provision of 
patient-centred care. But also in other 
professions, such as the teaching profes-
sion, there is a burgeoning interest in 
the merits of empathy (Demetriou 2018; 
Barton and Garvis 2019). As classrooms 
are becoming more multicultural and 
diverse the ability to grasp how things 
appear or feel from the perspective of 
the other – the vernacular definition 
of empathy – seems an increasingly 
important skill for budding teachers in 
the 21st century. 





University & Per 
Nortvedt, ph.d., 
professor emeritus, 




Reasoning and (lack of) 
Empathy
Even with respect to professions that 
have traditionally prided themselves of 
being unaffected by or unresponsive to 
emotions, such as the legal professions, 
it has recently been argued that empathy 
can and should play a role in guiding 
professional moral judgements (Hoffman 
2011). 
Despite a newfound interest in empathy 
however, a number of philosophers and 
psychologists have warned against 
empathy, arguing that it is inherently 
partial to those close to or resembling 
ourselves and susceptible to manipula-
tion, and thus, that we are ill advised to 
form moral judgements based on empa-
thy. Empathy, as some of the most vocal 
critics has it, is “by and large, bad for 
morality” (Prinz 2011a: 216) and that, “[f]
rom a moral standpoint, we are better off 
without it” (Bloom 2016: 4). If their argu-
ments are sound however, it would not 
only be bad for morality and our moral 
judgements, which have been shown to 
be more interwoven with our capacity to 
empathise than hitherto thought (Decety 
and Cowell 2014; Baron-Cohen 2011), but 
for the relational professions, which, as 
noted, often place a high value on the 
ability and willingness of its practitioners 
to empathise with their clients, and the 
theoretical discussion on a professional 
ethics in these professions.
However, while there is reason to be  
cautious about our unregulated 
empathic responses to the plights and 
needs of others as a guide to moral 
judgement, critics of empathy have failed 
to consider the consequences dismiss-
ing empathy out of hand may have for 
professional moral reasoning and – as a 
consequence – for a professional ethics1. 
This is particularly relevant for profes-
sionals working in the relational profes-
sions, such as health professionals and 
teachers, whose professional expertise 
is geared towards their clients. These 
professions have a particular responsibil-
ity to care for their clients, and fail – or so 
we shall argue – not necessarily in their 
moral judgements, but in their profes-
sional moral reasoning if they are unable 
or unwilling to assume the perspective of 
those they are trained to serve.
The argument relies on distinguishing 
between ‘moral reasoning’ and ‘moral 
judgement’, which, while intimately 
linked, may nevertheless be pried apart. 
Briefly, ‘moral reasoning’ may be thought 
of as the process by which we reach a 
moral judgement or verdict. Or, as Henry 
S. Richardson (2018) has it: “moral rea-
soning directed towards deciding what 
The ability and willingness to adopt the 
perspective of the other is thus partly 
constitutive of professional moral reasoning.
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to do involves forming judgments about 
what one ought, morally, to do”. Moral 
judgement, in turn, can be understood as 
“judgements that apply some moral con-
cept or other” (Crary 2007: 1). However, 
while we often focus on the moral judge-
ments – the outcome of our reasoning 
– it may be equally significant to inquire 
how we arrive at those conclusion. “The 
characteristic ways we attempt to work 
through a given sort of moral quandary”, 
as Richardson (2018) argues, “can be 
just as revealing about our considered 
approaches to these matters as are 
any bottom-line judgments we may 
characteristically come to”. This seems 
particularly true about moral reasoning 
in the relational professions, where our 
moral judgements pertain not only or 
primarily to ourselves, but to those in 
our care. We argue, therefore, that the 
ability and willingness to empathise with 
clients is constitutive of the professional 
moral reasoning of practitioners in the 
relational professions, and that inability 
or unwillingness to empathise is thus to 
fail in one’s professional moral reasoning.
In arguing that empathy is constitutive  
of professional moral reasoning in the 
relational professions, we begin, in 
section one, by providing a very brief 
outline of the recent spate of interest in 
empathy, drawing up some of the ways 
empathy have been defined and briefly 
sketching the main arguments against 
conceiving a role for empathy in morality. 
The discussion is in no way meant to 
be exhaustive, but to provide a working 
definition of empathy against which 
to assess the role of empathy in moral 
reasoning in the relational professions. 
In section two, we connect the discus-
sion of the role of empathy in morality 
with the question of moral obligation, in 
particular the special moral obligations 
that characterize the relational profes-
sions. While critics of empathy have 
presented arguments against conceiving 
of empathy as necessary or even useful 
for moral judgement, they have done so 
from a conception of the moral domain 
as exhausted by our natural obligations, 
that is; as what we owe each other as 
humans, without taking into account the 
special moral obligations we shoulder 
as a result of the many relations, either 
professionally or privately, in which most 
of us are engaged at various points in our 
lives. This has made empathy seem irrel-
evant or even an aberration in addressing 
moral questions, and in the third section 
of the essay, we argue that this omission 
explains the failure to accord for the 
importance of empathy in professional 
moral reasoning. Not because profes-
sionals in the relational professions 
are morally obliged to empathise, but 
because in some of our private or profes-
sional roles we simply cannot ignore the 
perspective of those we are set to serve, 
without thereby failing to perform that 
role as we should. Lacking empathy, 
we argue, professional moral reasoning 
would be inadequate, and the ability and 
willingness to adopt the perspective of 
the other is thus partly constitutive of 
professional moral reasoning, without 
which professionals would fail their most 
fundamental purpose. If not strictly 
speaking necessary for professional 
moral judgements, empathy, we claim,   
is the sine qua non of professional moral 
reasoning in the relational professions.
A contested concept 
Empathy is on the rebound and is cur-
rently being rediscovered after having 
been neglected as a philosophical 
concept since it fell out of favour in the 
middle of the 20th century (Frazer 2013; 
Stueber 2006). Having caught the atten-
tion of scholars and non-scholars alike, 
the past two decades have seen a surge 
of interest in empathy from within a 
surprisingly wide range of disciplines and 
topics. The concept has been explored 
not only in philosophy and psychology, 
but in fields as distinct as neurology, 
education, history, political science, cul-
tural history, and aesthetics, and invoked 
in political campaigns, therapeutic meth-
ods, and in engagement with art and 
the media (Coplan 2011; Matravers 2017; 
Maibom 2014, 2017). As a consequence 
of the diversity however, empathy has 
been understood in a variety of different, 
sometimes incompatible ways, thereby 
making a discussion of the role and func-
tion of empathy difficult.
Starting from an everyday conception 
of empathy, e.g. as  the ability to use our 
“imagination as a tool so as to adopt a 
different perspective in order to grasp 
how things appear (or feel) from here” 
(Matravers 2017: 1-2), is a good way to 
bring some of the central dividing lines in 
the debate into view. Firstly, it is possible 
to distinguish between those who con-
strue empathy primarily as an affective 
phenomenon, and those who emphasise 
its cognitive side. Interested in differ-
ent aspects of the phenomenon, some 
scholars focus more or less exclusively 
on the ability to feel as the other does, 
what has become known in the literature 
as affective empathy, while others take 
empathy first and foremost to be our 
cognitive ability to grasp or understand 
the situation of another (Maibom 2017, 
Spaulding 2017). Secondly, a distinction 
may be drawn between those who think 
of empathy as pertaining to higher-level 
mental processes (Matravers 2017), and 
those who include in their definition of 
empathy subconscious processes, e.g. 
emotional contagion and mirror neurons 
(Hoffman 2011, Maibom 2017, Prinz 2011a, 
2011b). And thirdly, a distinction may 
be drawn between those who separate 
sharply between empathy and sympa-
thy, and those who do not. While most 
scholars distinguish clearly between 
empathy, which is often defined as being 
other-oriented in being presented as the 
feelings and perspective of the other, 
and sympathy, which is a first-person 
feeling towards the target (Coplan and 
Goldie 2011), some explicitly take empa-
thy to involve a concern for the other 
(Baron-Cohen 2011) or as at least as 
encompassing various types of empathic 
concern (Hofmann 2011).
While empathy, as noted, has been 
explored in relation to a number of phe-
nomena, one of the most hotly discussed 
questions in the recent debate has been 
what role – if any – empathy plays and 
ought to play in ethics. While some of 
those contributing to the recent debate 
have seen empathy as fundamental to 
our moral reasoning, and as the “cement 
of the moral universe” (Slote 2010: 13), 
others have been less sanguine about 
the purpose and usefulness of the 
concept as a moral concept.
A particularly scathing criticism of 
empathy in moral reasoning has come 
from Paul Bloom (2016) and Jesse Prinz 
(2011a, 2011b). Addressing the claim 
that empathy is necessary for moral 
judgements, which can be understood 
either as the claim that empathy is a 
constitutive, causal, or epistemological 
precondition for moral judgements, 
Prinz (2011a, 2011b) construes a series of 
counter-examples to show that empathy 
is not necessary for moral judgement 
in any of these ways. Since I may judge 
that you have done something wrong 
without empathising (i.e. feeling what 
you or, if there is one, your victim is 
feeling), Prinz argues, empathy cannot 
be constitutive of moral judgement. Nor, 
he argues, can empathy be a necessary 
causal precondition, as I may judge that 
something is wrong before empathising 
(Prinz 2011a). Meticulously addressing 
the various ways in which empathy has 
been claimed to be necessary for moral 
judgement, Prinz finds them all wanting 
and concludes that “we can have moral 
systems without empathy” (Prinz 2011b: 
213).
However, even if grant the argument and 
accept that empathy is not necessary 
for moral judgement, it may be thought 
that empathy is beneficial to moral 
judgements and that we therefore ought 
to encourage the fostering of empathy. 
Empirical studies from moral psychol-
ogy however, appears to support the 
conclusion that we feel greater empathy 
for those who are similar to ourselves, 
one study using brain imaging indicating 
“that Caucasians were more empathetic 
to the pain of other Caucasians than to 
ethnically Chinese participants – and 
conversely” (Prinz 2011a: 227). As 
One of the most hotly discussed questions  
in the recent debate has been what role  
– if any – empathy plays and ought to play  
in ethics. 
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empathy is also prone to manipulation – 
we respond emotionally e.g. to displays 
of regret – empathy, Prinz continues, 
“has limitations that make it ill-suited for 
some moral ends” (Prinz 2011a: 227).
Both Prinz and Bloom however, con-
ceive empathy as affective, argue that 
empathising does not require the use 
of the imagination, and that empathy 
should be understood to include 
subconscious processes. This may 
immediately seem to present their 
objections against empathy – at least 
if we think of moral reasoning in the 
relational professions – as somewhat 
misguided. From the perspective of the 
relational professions, what is relevant is 
not a subconscious ability to feel as the 
other does, but the ability and willing-
ness to achieve what Peter Goldie (2011) 
calls in-his-shoes perspective-shifting; 
a conscious attempt to understand the 
situation and feelings of the other by 
imagining being in that situation. Arguing 
that it is possible to achieve in-his-shoes 
perspective-shifting, as opposed to a 
more ambitious empathic perspective-
shifting, where we imagine being the 
person in question, Goldie defends the 
claim that this allows us to come to a 
genuine, although limited understand-
ing of others. If it is possible to achieve 
knowledge of other minds through this 
kind of empathic-imagining, it may be 
though that a correct appreciation of the 
situation of the other would be valuable, 
even in some cases a prerequisite, for 
the ability to form moral judgement, and 
thus that empathy has a role to play in 
our moral reasoning. However, if – as 
evidence seems to suggest – we tend 
to empathise more strongly with those 
close to or resembling ourselves, it may 
be warned that in-his-shoes perspective-
shifting may be easier to achieve with 
those resembling ourselves and thus 
lead us deeper into a moral quagmire. 
Even if empathy allows us to understand 
one another, it may therefore be argued 
that empathy ought not to play a role in 
our moral reasoning; that the inherent 
partiality of empathy makes it a bad and 
unreliable moral guide. 
The moral domain:  
Natural and special obligations
The objections against conceiving a role 
for empathy in moral reasoning may 
seem decisive, leaving any hope of an 
empathy-infused morality looking like a 
muddled attempt to have one’s cake and 
eat it too. We are so accustomed to the 
idea that moral judgements – in order to 
be moral judgements – are required to 
be impartial and universal, that any sug-
gestion that our judgements may be less 
than impartial seems to disqualify them 
as such, In fact, so ingrained is this view, 
that in the analytic tradition “the phrases 
‘moral point of view’ and ‘impartial (or 
‘impersonal’) point of view’”, as Jollimore 
(2017) argues, “are sometimes used 
interchangeably to refer to the imagined 
impersonal perspective from which, it 
is supposed, moral judgments are to be 
made”.
Despite the force of this line of thought, 
common sense morality, as Diane Jeske 
(2019) points out, also has it that we bear 
special obligations. Most of us occupy 
a number of roles, e.g. father, husband, 
nurse, which, at least according to our 
common sense, requires us to give moral 
priority to a significant other. As a con-
sequence of the commitment of moral 
philosophy in the analytic tradition to 
the impartiality of morality however, “the 
tradition has struggled to accommodate 
role-obligations, such as those of lawyers 
towards their clients or parents towards 
their own children” (Dare and Swanton 
2020: 1). A central question in much 
recent moral philosophy has thus been 
how to square the two thoughts: How 
can we both be obliged to judge from an 
impartial perspective while also fulfilling 
our special obligations?
The notion of special obligations seems 
particularly troublesome for conse-
quentialism, which, for simplicity, can be 
characterised as the view that the good 
equals “that action which, of all alterna-
tives available to the agent, produces 
the greatest net sum of intrinsic value” 
(Jeske 2019). On the face of it, conse-
quentialism thus seems to mandate that 
we treat everyone the same, as, all things 
being equal, the amount of value I may 
produce by saving a is the same as if I 
were to save b instead. As Jeske (2019) 
points out however, “the consequential-
ist can argue that, in fact, each person 
acting so as to benefit her friends, loved 
ones, promisees, etc., will have the 
best overall consequences”. This line of 
reasoning however, is not open to those 
who take partiality in moral reasoning to 
be intrinsically bad. And given that the 
strongest arguments against empathy 
is that it engenders partiality, it seems 
that a dismissive attitude to empathy 
in moral reasoning makes it hard to see 
how we can have special obligations at 
all. But does the converse hold? Does the 
idea that we have special obligations also 
require that we are able and willing to 
empathise? Or could our special obliga-
tions be discharged without empathy? 
Professionals may discharge their 
moral obligation without empathy, while 
nevertheless retaining an important role  
for empathy in the professions. 
Special obligations  
and professional roles
The answers to the above seem to 
depend on the content of the special 
obligation in question. But what exactly 
are we obliged to in virtue of standing in 
relations that generate special obliga-
tions?
Special obligations come into play in a 
range of aspects of our lives, and differ-
ent relations will carry different obliga-
tions. In some cases, spelling out the 
content of the obligation may be more 
straightforward than in others; some of 
the roles we occupy are more strictly 
regulated than others, wearing their 
obligations ‘on their sleeves’, as Tim Dare 
(2020) writes. Others are less formal, 
with implicit role-expectations which 
may be more or less open to interpreta-
tion and subject to shifting contexts. 
Social roles, such as that of being a 
father or brother, come with special  
obligations that are largely implicit, with 
few or any formal requirements. Profes-
sional roles, on the other hand, are often 
more clearly defined and may include 
specific legal obligations and vows or 
pledges by the professional, undertaken 
either through written or oral acts of 
promising as part of granting the profes-
sional his or her licence. 
Much has been written about the 
political-functional grounding of 
professional roles and how it shapes 
professional obligation. Unlike social 
roles, professional roles is the product 
of an authoritative institutional design 
intended to serve some societal function 
or greater purpose  (Grimen 2006), and 
it is a widely held view that, as Alexandra 
and Seumus (2009: 109) argue,
“[t]o understand the specific content of 
professional role morality, then, we need 
to examine the purposes that the various 
professions have been formed to serve, 
and the way in which professional roles 
must be constructed in order to achieve 
those purposes” 
Some have taken this even further, 
arguing that “a ‘role obligation’ is a moral 
requirement, which attaches to an 
institutional role, whose content is fixed 
by the function of the role” (Hardimon 
1994: 334).
On the face of it therefore, the answer 
to the above question seems to be that 
one may fulfil the moral obligation of 
one’s role without taking a particular 
interest in how things look or feel from 
the perspective of the other. Thus, a 
physician or nurse may administer health 
services and care according to protocol 
without being able or willing to appre-
hend the feelings of the patient, but 
without thereby being morally blame-
worthy. Likewise, a teacher that teaches 
according to the requirements, treats 
all her pupils fairly (e.g. equally, avoiding 
discrimination, with respect, etc.), and 
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maintains confidentiality may be said to 
fulfil the moral obligations of her role, 
despite failing to imagine the situation 
from the point of view of her pupils.
Most of us however, would feel poorly 
treated by a physician, or a teacher for 
that sake, who did not give the impres-
sion of at least attempting to see things 
from our perspective. We do expect 
doctors and teachers to be empathic and 
reproach those who fail to live up to this 
expectation. The reason we are offended 
by that kind of behaviour, according to 
Dare (2020) is that the role-obligation is 
not exhausted by the functional obliga-
tion of the role, but includes moreover, 
a set of signalling functions. “Roles”, 
he argues, “are signalling devices. They 
allow us to know in advance what we 
can expect and demand from those 
with whom we engage” (Dare 2020: 39). 
Borrowing an idea from HLA Heart, Dare 
(2020: 36) argues that,
“[t]he complex social practices around 
roles within communities and the atti-
tudes of community members toward 
them generate role-norms, whose 
existence and content is determined by 
those social practices”.
This is perhaps most easily seen with 
respect to social roles. We readily 
understand the implication of the 
charge, Dare (2020) argues, if someone 
says that ‘he was never really a father 
to me’. Being a father, we tend to think, 
amounts to more than providing a mini-
mum of material support (e.g. shelter, 
food, and clothes), but fundamentally, 
and more importantly, requires assum-
ing an interest in the well-being of his 
children, exhibiting a certain modicum of 
compassion, patience, care, lovingness 
etc. towards them. This is not part of 
the formal obligations of fatherhood (if 
there are any), but constitute some of 
the informal expectations we attach to 
fatherhood in our day and age. 
While clearly constitutive of social roles 
however, the signalling function also 
plays an important role in our conception 
of and the continuous transformation of 
professional roles – as can be seen from 
the gradual shift in the relation between 
the professional and the client in the 
relational professions in the second half 
of the 20th century. From being domi-
nated by a paternalistic outlook, these 
professions have been forced to change 
their attitudes to their clients and to 
adopt a more inclusive attitude. How-
ever, while it seems that expectations 
do contribute to shaping professional 
roles, they do not do so exclusively, as 
they do in shaping social roles, nor do 
they contribute to shaping professional 
roles in exactly the same way as they do 
in shaping social roles. Overstating the 
similarities between social and profes-
sional roles, Dare (2020) ignores the 
constitutive relation between intentional 
design and role obligations, taking both 
social and professional moral roles to be 
the product of social expectations ‘all the 
way down’. 
Concluding remarks
Acknowledging that professional roles 
are characterised both by intentional 
design, which determines obligation, and 
social expectations however, allows us 
to see how professionals may discharge 
their moral obligation without empathy, 
while nevertheless retaining an important 
role for empathy in the professions. On 
the one hand, to fulfil the social expecta-
tions of the role, professionals in the 
relational professions must be able and 
willing to grasp how the situation appears 
from the perspective of the client; they 
must be able and willing, that is, to ‘step 
into the shoes’ of the client and assess 
the situation from his or her point of view. 
Thus, in reasoning about the correct 
course of action, it is not enough that 
the professional is able to arrive at a 
moral judgement, but that the reason-
ing process includes the perspective of 
the client. In order to figure in the moral 
deliberation however, empathy cannot be 
the unreflective and inarticulate affective 
state described by Bloom and Prinz, but 
must be a conscious attempt to under-
stand the situation of the other, both 
cognitively and affectively, by imagining 
being in the situation of the other akin 
to the process described by Goldie as 
in-his-shoes perspective-shifting.
This does not mean however, that profes-
sionals are obliged to judge in accord-
ance with how the client perceives the 
situation. In many cases, that would be 
irresponsible and in conflict with profes-
sional expertise, potentially resulting in 
disastrous outcomes. Professionals are 
expected to judge on the basis of their 
expertise, experience, and knowledge of 
laws and regulations, and empathy may 
not be necessary for or even play any 
role in the moral conclusion, allowing that 
the professional may discharge his or her 
moral obligations without empathising. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that 
empathy plays no significant role in pro-
fessional ethics: Expected to be able and 
willing to assume the perspective of the 
client, empathy plays a constitutive role 
in professional moral reasoning, in delib-
erating about the right course of action. 
Professionals flouting this expectations 
are reduced to expert bureaucrats; 
automaton vested with the responsibility 
of serving a particular social function and 
authoritative institutional design. Lack 
of empathy in professional exercise thus 
undermines, not the validity or correct-
ness of individual moral judgements, but 
the process of moral deliberation consti-
tutive of professional moral reasoning. 
Professionalism without empathy, we 
argue, is simply an oxymoron, and the 
failure to empathise is thus not to fail in 
a particular moral judgement but to fail 
more fundamentally as a professional.
The failure to empathise is thus not to fail in 
a particular moral judgement but to fail more 
fundamentally as a professional.
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